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Girman, S.V., Sauve, Y., and Lund, R.D. (1999). J. Neurophysiol. 82,cortex (Shmuel and Grinvald, 2000). They hypothesize
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that these different patterns occur because the connec-
Koulakov, A.A., and Chklovskii, D.B. (2001). Neuron 29, this issue,tion function is different in the different cortical areas
519–527.
concerned: it is predicted to be broadest in the rat, less
Mitchison, G. (1991). Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 245, 151–158.
so in those areas of cat cortex that lack singularities,
Obermayer, K., and Blasdel, G.G. (1997). Neural Comp. 9, 555–567.
and narrowest in primates and other species where a
Shmuel, A., and Grinvald, A. (2000). Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 97,relatively high density of singularities is always found
5568–5573.
(Obermayer and Blasdel, 1997).
Wolf, F., and Geisel, T. (1998). Nature 395, 73–78.
These findings are interesting because they show, for
the first time, that singularities may be adaptive features
whose role is to minimize wire length. (The authors do
not say by how much, although presumably it would
not be difficult to calculate.) There are some additional
interesting implications. It can be shown that previous Turning the Dial on Object
models of orientation map development tend to favor Perceptionthe Icecube layout of orientation as a final stable state.
This can be proved analytically, as Koulakov and
Chklovskii do for one particular model, or it can be ob-
One of the more challenging aspects of neuroimagingserved in simulations that singularities tend to disappear
studies of higher cortical function is the isolation of a
slowly over time (Wolf and Geisel, 1998). Technically,
mental operation of interest. An experimental condition
this means that the cost functions for these other models
that evokes the cognitive process of working memory,
are minimized by arrangements in which singularities
semantic retrieval, or spatial representation, for exam-
are absent. From the point of view of these previous
ple, can be expected to evoke a number of other
models (and perhaps the modelers as well), singularities
processes as well (e.g., stimulus perception, eye move-
are developmental artifacts and represent nonoptimal ments, response preparation, etc.). The “cognitive sub-
configurations of the map. That singularities are present traction” method tackles this problem by comparing the
in most model maps is because the models either con- neural activity evoked by matched experimental and
tain features that prevent the optimum configuration control conditions that putatively differ only in the cogni-
from being reached or because it simply takes too long tive process of interest. The assumptions, however, that
to compute the optimum solution. In reality, this may cognitive subtraction requires are themselves problem-
not be a problem because development, like the models, atic (Friston et al., 1996; Zarahn et al., 1997) and stem
may also only incompletely minimize the cost function. in part from the need to evoke the mental operation
For example, the factors that bring the critical period to under study in an all-or-nothing fashion. Parametric ma-
an end may “freeze” the map in what is, from a computa- nipulations of cognitive processes (in which the level of
tional perspective, an intermediate state. This would the operation, as opposed to its presence or absence,
result in a map that fortuitously produces a shorter wire is varied) have less stringent assumptions and therefore
length than if the process were to proceed to comple- provide for stronger inference.
tion. However, Koulakov and Chklovskii suggest that it In this issue of Neuron, Bar and colleagues present
might be better to abandon these models in favor of an fMRI study of object recognition that is parametric
others that do explicitly minimize wire length. They pro- in a clever way (Bar et al., 2001). Subjects were asked
pose experiments that may help to decide whether evo- to identify simple objects briefly flashed on a screen
lution has selected developmental mechanisms of map and to rate the confidence of their recognition on a scale
formation primarily on the basis of their ability to mini- of 1 to 4. The speed of presentation and a poststimulus
mize wire length, or whether it has selected mechanisms mask made the task rather difficult, with the result that
that do a reasonably good job of minimizing wire length, sometimes stimuli were clearly identified by the subject,
but whose main role is something else. Since the “some- but sometimes the subject was uncertain, or worse. The
thing else” has not yet been identified, perhaps it is time, authors reasoned that if a region of the brain contributes
despite the difficulties, to start looking more carefully in a computationally meaningful way to object recogni-
at the ability of wire length constraints to explain what tion, then there should be a systematic relationship be-
we know about cortical maps. tween the magnitude of neural activity at that location
and the subject’s report of recognition confidence. Con-
sider the two regions with the patterns of neural activity
Nicholas V. Swindale illustrated by the solid and dashed lines in the figure.
Department of Ophthalmology The solid line represents the pattern of neural activity
University of British Columbia found by the authors in retinotopic, “early” visual areas,
2550 Willow Street while the dashed line represents the pattern found in
Vancouver the anterior fusiform gyrus (interestingly, other patterns
British Columbia V5Z 3N9 of response, such as a “U” function, were found in other
areas).Canada
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Object Perception
Subjects viewed briefly presented line draw-
ings of objects on each trial and reported on
a scale of 1-4 how confident they were of
their ability to identify the object. The text
below each object offers an apocryphal view
of the subject’s thought process. Below, the
relationship between neural activity and re-
ported confidence is shown for the anterior
fusiform gyrus (dashed line on the graph and
dashed arrow) and earlier visual areas (solid
line on the graph and solid arrow).
What can be said about the role that these regions or absence of a mask (even in the setting of equivalent
levels of recognition confidence), while the fusiform areaplay in object recognition given their different patterns
of response? Clearly, we cannot take these results as reflected only the confidence of object recognition. Also
of interest was a frontal gyrus site that demonstratedevidence of the necessity of any given region for object
recognition, as lesions to any of the identified areas increasing degrees of neural activity for increasing confi-
dence of recognition, but had reduced responses whenmight impair object recognition (area V1, for example).
Instead, the inferences to be drawn are on the level of the masking stimulus was removed (i.e., when the task
was made much “easier”). The interpretation of this pat-information processing. Areas with flat responses (solid
line) support visual computations that are agnostic (in tern of response is still uncertain, but the authors con-
sider intriguing possibilities in terms of attention andterms of bulk neural activity) to the ultimate identification
of a stimulus as a particular object. This tells us some- search effort.
Excepting the manipulation of the mask presence orthing about the “modularity” of processing in these loca-
tions, in that the region engages in computations that absence, subjects were presented with identical stimuli
on all trials. It therefore cannot be argued that the resultsseem insensitive to the status of the input as an object.
We might imagine that interruption of this computation reflect some systematic difference in stimulus property
that is more present in object stimuli than other typeswould impair aspects of visual processing beyond ob-
ject recognition. This is in contrast to those regions that of stimuli. This encourages the authors to argue that the
activation seen in the fusiform gyrus is the result ofdemonstrated a relationship between neural activity and
confidence of object recognition (dotted line). Such re- object processing and illustrates the power of paramet-
ric designs that manipulate the process of interest itself,gions potentially support computations that are relevant
to object recognition per se, so that local manipulations as opposed to designs that attempt to isolate the pro-
cess by subtraction. Despite the uniform nature of theof neural activity would impact object recognition per-
formance more precisely. stimuli and the cogent arguments of the authors, how-
ever, it is still possible that the regions identified asAdditional information was provided by a second ma-
nipulation performed by the authors, in which stimulus having a linear relationship with confidence of object
recognition are engaged in computations that can beproperties (i.e., whether the stimulus was masked or
not) were varied as well. Interestingly, activity in early described in other terms. For example, the identified
region might engage in texture analysis, with the variabil-visual areas was found to be sensitive to the presence
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ity in response magnitude related to the degree of suc-
cessful processing. If the quality of texture analysis can
influence the ability of the subject to identify objects,
then we could observe a linear relationship between
confidence report and neural activity. Similar arguments
can be made for associated processes such as form
analysis, semantic retrieval, etc. A perhaps more sophis-
ticated view is that these putatively confounding mental
operations actually constitute object identification (Ta-
naka, 1993; Malach et al., 1995); i.e., it is fruitless to
seek a naked object recognition process that is not itself
composed of interactions between representations of
shape, meaning, and function. If so, then the present
study has identified for us a number of cortical regions
that seem computationally important for object recogni-
tion. It will be the job of future studies to determine if
and how these sites uniquely contribute to this behavior.
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